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HYBRISTES EI: SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES, AND AGATHON 
 
Elizabeth Belfiore 
 Department of Classical and Near Eastern Studies 
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities 
esb@umn.edu 
 
 1. Introduction 
 The Symposium contains a vivid and memorable portrait of Socrates. The 
philosopher, however, is characterized in confusing and apparently inconsistent ways. 
The multiple layers of narration constantly remind the reader that the dialogue cannot be 
accepted at face value as a historically accurate transcription of the “words and deeds” of 
Socrates, but is fiction, requiring critical evaluation by the reader.1 Moreover, the many 
different narrators represent Socrates as having a puzzling variety of characteristics. He is 
presented as an expert on erotic matters (177d7-8), an erastes and eromenos (222b3-4), 
and as a figure who resembles the Eros of Diotima’s speech.2 Socrates is also portrayed 
as both hubristic and virtuous, comic and serious. According to Alcibiades, Socrates 
spends his life playing, but is also capable of being deeply serious (216e4-6). The 
philosopher has the virtues of courage, moderation (sophrosyne), understanding 
(phronesis) and endurance (219d4-7), but is also guilty of disdain, mockery, hybris and 
arrogance (219c3-6; hybris: cf. 215b7, 222a8). 
 It is difficult for the reader to interpret this perplexing, composite portrait of the 
philosopher who is said to play roles--erotic, ethical, and dramatic--that are usually 
thought to be incompatible. 3 One suggestion about how to understand Socrates is given 
by Alcibiades, in his representation of the philosopher by means of comic images (214e4-
5, 215a5) that have the serious purpose of revealing the truth (215a6). Socrates, he says, 
resembles the hollow statues of sileni that open up to reveal images of the gods (215a6-
b3, 216e5-217a1); he is like a ridiculous, hubristic, and lustful satyr, who plays divine 
tunes on the aulos (215b7-c6, 216d2-4). On the outside, his words are like the skin of a 
hubristic satyr, but on the inside they are most divine and contain the most images of 
virtue (221d7-222a6). Modern scholars often take Alcibiades’ image to represent what 
Plato considered to be the truth about his Socrates: that the outer satyr is a deceptive 
appearance concealing the inner truth. This is a plausible interpretation of Alcibiades’ 
opinion of Socrates, but Alcibiades does not necessarily speak for Plato. The dialogue 
gives the reader many reasons for questioning the account given by the drunken young 
man, whose veracity is open to doubt, and who admits that Socrates reduces him to 
perplexity (219e3). The image itself requires opening up by the reader, who has more 
information about Socrates than its creator.  
                                                
1 See further, Belfiore 1984. 
2 Expert on erotics: Gould 1963, 58-79; Roochnik 1987. Lover and beloved: Blundell 1992, 123-130, 
Halperin 1986, 68-70 and 1990, 132-133; Edmonds 2000. Eros: Bury 1932, xlii, lx-lxii; Osborne 1994, 93-
101; Robin 1951, ciii-cviii. Socrates is also an erotic figure in the Socratic literature: Kahn 1994 and 1996, 
1-35.  
3Clay 2000, 143 (cf. 93-95) notes that Socrates was characterized as dimorphos (two-formed) by an 
anonymous comic writer (SSR I.A.17, vol. 1, p. 17). 
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 Alcibiades’ portrait of Socrates can be better understood in light of the 
philosopher’s complementary, but less studied, interactions with Agathon. Like 
Alcibiades, Agathon attributes to Socrates a superior wisdom that he seeks to acquire by 
touch (175c7-d2; cf. 218c7-d5), and, like Alcibiades, Agathon accuses Socrates of hybris 
after failing in this attempt (175e7). There are indications, however, that Agathon is 
better able to benefit from his association with Socrates than is Alcibiades. After a brief 
discussion of the Greek concepts of hybris and disdain (section 2), this paper focuses on 
Socrates’ interactions with these two men. I argue that Socrates is portrayed by the 
multiple narrators of the Symposium as both a comic, hubristic and satyr-like figure 
(section 3), and as a man of extraordinary virtue (section 4). Although Alcibiades, who 
missed the speech Socrates attributes to Diotima, grasps only part of the truth, his image 
of the silenus-statue can help us to understand the relationship between these two 
apparently inconsistent sets of characteristics (section 5). The outer satyr-like figure is 
not merely a deceptive appearance, as Alcibiades believes, nor do the inner divinities and 
images of virtue represent the whole truth about Socrates. Alcibiades identifies the satyr 
with Marsyas, and there is good reason to suppose that one of the inner divinities of his 
image is Eros. The reader, then, is in a position to recognize that the satyr Marsyas, and 
the daimon Eros of Diotima’s speech are not essentially different. Both are images of one 
and the same figure: the erotic philosopher. 
 
2. Hybris and Disdain 
A brief survey of the Greek concepts of hybris and disdain will give us a better 
understanding about how Socrates’ behavior would have appeared to a Greek audience. 
Rhetoric 2.2, Aristotle defines anger as “desire, accompanied by pain, for retaliation, 
because of what appears to be slighting [ὀλιγωρίαν]” (1378a30-31), and he defines 
“slighting” as “the actualization of opinion concerning that which appears to be worth 
nothing” (1378b11). Disdain is one kind of slighting: “The person who disdains slights. 
For people disdain things they think are worth nothing, and they slight things that are 
worth nothing” (1378b15-17). Another kind of slighting is hybris: 
 
The man committing hybris also slights: for hybris is doing and saying 
things at which the victim incurs shame, not in order that one may achieve 
anything other than what is done but simply to get pleasure from it. For 
those who act in return for something do not commit hybris, they avenge 
themselves. The cause of the pleasure for those committing hybris is that 
by harming people they think themselves to be superior (that is why the 
young and the rich are hybristai; they think they are superior when 
committing hybris). Dishonour is characteristic of hybris, and he who 
dishonours someone slights him, since what has no worth has no honour, 
either for good or for bad. That is why Achilles says when angry: “He 
dishonoured me; for he has himself taken my prize, and keeps it” (Iliad 
1.356) and “He treated me as if I were a wanderer without honour” (Iliad 
9.648=17.59), since he is angry for those reasons.4 
 
                                                
4 Rhet. 1378b23-35.Translation Fisher 1992, 8, with his parenthetical references. 
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Aristotle goes on to explain that slighting causes anger when people think they ought to 
be highly esteemed by those who are inferior in whatever respect they themselves are far 
superior, for example, in birth, power, virtue, wealth, ability to speak well or to rule. 
They are also angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to be 
treated well, for example, those whom they have benefited or desire to benefit (1378b35-
1379a9). Aristotle also says that people are angry at those who laugh at, mock, or make 
fun of them, for these people are committing hybris (1379a30-32).  
 Aristotle’s passage supports the view of N. R. E. Fisher and Douglas Cairns that 
there is a close connection in Greek thought between hybris and dishonor. According to 
Fisher, “hybris is essentially the serious assault on the honour of another, which is likely 
to cause shame, and lead to anger and attempts at revenge,” and it involves committing 
“acts of intentional insult . . . which deliberately inflict shame and dishonour on others.”5 
Cairns also stresses the association of hybris with honor, arguing that “the most 
fundamental of all significances of hybris” is “the idea that hybris involves a disposition 
in the agent which overvalues self and undervalues others.”6  
  Socrates’ behavior in the Symposium meets Aristotle’s criteria for slighting 
(Rhet.1378b15-17, quoted above) in that he is represented as showing disdain 
(καταφρόνησις) for things he thinks are worth nothing. According to Alcibiades, Socrates 
disdains Alcibiades’ beauty and other external advantages (216d7-e2, 219c4), and he 
offends common soldiers, who think he is showing disdain for them when he walks 
unshod on ice (220b7-c1). In being disdainful, Socrates might appear to be following the 
advice of his teacher, Diotima, who says that the lover must learn to loosen his regard for 
one body, “disdaining it and thinking it to be a small thing” (210b5-6).  
The question of Socrates’ hybris is more complicated. According to some 
scholars, the accusations of hybris are “humourously exaggerated,” but others take them 
seriously.7 A good case can be made for interpreting Socrates’ behavior toward Agathon 
and Alcibiades as meeting Fisher’s definition of hybris as a “serious assault on the 
honour of another, which is likely to cause shame, and lead to anger and attempts at 
revenge.”8 Because Socrates openly slights those things of which Agathon and Alcibiades 
are most proud--respectively, the ability to speak well before a crowd and physical 
beauty, --he can be seen as dishonoring the two men. That Socrates does and says things 
“at which the victim incurs shame” (Rhet. 1378b24) is clear from Alcibiades’ admission 
that Socrates makes him ashamed of himself (216b2). Moreover, both Agathon and 
Alcibiades express anger and threaten revenge when they speak of bringing Socrates to 
trial (175e7-10, 219c5-6). On the other hand, Socrates does not meet Aristotle’s criteria 
for hybris in that he is not represented by the narrators as slighting in order to get 
pleasure from harming people and demonstrating his own superiority (Rhet. 1378b23-
29).  
Another aspect of Socrates’ behavior is relevant to an understanding of the 
charges of hybris. Alcibiades links Socrates’ hybris to that of satyrs: “And I say that he is 
                                                
5 Fisher, 1992, 1 and 148. 
6 Cairns 1996, 26.  
7 “Humoursously exaggerated”: Fisher 1992, 454 Rowe 1998, on 175e8, and 215a5-222b7. The charges are 
taken seriously by Nightingale 1995, 114-117; Scott 2000, 141.  
8 Fisher 1992, 1.  
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like the satyr Marsyas. That you are like him in appearance, Socrates, not even you would 
contest. Next, listen to how you resemble him in other respects also. You are hubristic, 
aren’t you? If you don’t agree, I’ll furnish witnesses” (215b3-7). In myth, the satyr 
Marsyas was hubristic in challenging Apollo at the aulos, a crime for which he was 
flayed.9 However, this aspect of the myth is never explicitly mentioned, and another 
reference to satyrs in Alcibiades’ speech make it clear that what he calls Socrates’ hybris 
is satyr-like in a more general way. Socrates’ words, says Alcibiades, resemble “the skin 
of some hubristic satyr” (221e2-4).  
Satyrs are typically represented as violating and inverting social norms. The very 
appearance of these half-human, half-bestial creatures is transgressive. Satyrs are often 
represented as drinking excessively and in other ways violating sympotic norms. Their 
sexual behavior is also excessive and transgressive. Far from observing the norms for the 
behavior of erastai that were intended to avoid dishonoring the eromenoi, satyrs 
frequently commit such sexual offenses as attempted rape, a particularly salient example 
of hybris that dishonors another. In transgressing social norms in this and other respects, 
satyrs are hubristic because they put gratification of their own desires ahead of the honor 
of others.10 Satyrs also arouse laughter, a characteristic notably exploited in the satyr 
play. Satyrs are themselves objects of laughter, but they may also hubristically direct 
laughter at others. Indeed, mockery is a form of hybris, in Greek culture, and to make 
someone an object of laughter is to shame and dishonor him or her. Conversely, to 
dishonor someone is to make him or her an object of laughter. For example, after 
Odysseus gives Thersites “dishonoring blows” (Il. 2.264), all the other men laugh at 
Thersites (270).11 Someone who commits hybris often does things that appear ridiculous, 
as Conon does when he crows like a cock over his victim (Demosthenes 54. 9), but it is 
the victim who is the real object of laughter. Similarly, in behaving transgressively and 
violating the honor of others, satyrs make their victims the objects of laughter.  
Alcibiades’ Socrates is satyr-like because he transgresses social norms in ways 
that satyrs do. He violates convention in physical appearance (215b4-6, 216d4) and 
behavior, as will be shown in more detail below, section 3. Socrates is silenus-like in 
having an erotic nature (216d2-4), in large part because he violates convention by playing 
the role of both erastes and eromenos (222b3-4). Socrates also resembles a hubristic satyr 
in arousing laughter. He does this in two ways, according to Alcibiades. First, Socrates is 
himself the object of laughter. An inexperienced and foolish person would laugh at 
Socrates’ words, that at first appear ridiculous, like the skin of a hubristic satyr, being 
concerned with such subjects as pack-asses and tanners (221e1-222a1). Alcibiades 
indicates that Socrates himself is laughable when he suggests that the philosopher would 
most appropriately sit beside “Aristophanes or someone who is ridiculous and wants to 
be so” (213c2-5). Alcibiades’ speech also makes Socrates the object of laughter. Socrates 
asks if Alcibiades is going to praise him by making people laugh (214e4-5), and the 
young man’s speech does indeed have this effect (222c1). Partly for this reason, it is a 
“satyric and silenic drama” (222d3-4). However, Socrates, is also represented as 
                                                
9 Flaying: Solon frag. 33.7 West, Herodotus 7.26, Euthydemus 285c9-d1.  
10 Satyrs: Lissarrague 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1993. Erastai and eromenoi: Golden 1984.  
11 Mockery: Arist. Rhet. 1379a30-34, Top. 144a5-7 (Fisher 1992, 11-12). Hybris and the ridiculous: Crat. 
426b6, Prot. 355c8, Hipp. Maj. 286c8, e2. 
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resembling a satyr in hubristically make others the objects of laughter. According to 
Alcibiades, he laughed at the young man’s beauty, thereby committing hybris (219c4-5). 
 The comic image of the satyr, then, has a serious philosophical purpose in 
Alcibiades’ speech, serving to characterize Socrates as hubristic in specific respects. 
Section 3 examines in detail the evidence for this aspect of the philosopher’s behavior. 
 
3. The Skin of a Hubristic Satyr 
 The occasion at which the events are represented as taking place is significant for 
an understanding of Socrates’ behavior. Agathon, who has just won first prize in a tragic 
competition, has invited a few friends to a celebratory dinner and symposium. The poet 
has every reason to think he is superior in his ability to speak well, and every reason to 
expect praise and good will from his friends, especially on the present occasion, when he 
is benefiting them by inviting them to dinner. Agathon would, then, according to 
Aristotle’s account (Rhet. 1378b35-1379a9), be ready to see as a slight by his friends and 
guests any rudeness or any suggestion that he lacks the ability to speak well.  
 Socrates’ treatment of Agathon meets Aristotle’s criteria for disdain. In the first 
place, the philosopher is a very rude guest to Agathon. Contrary to his usual custom, 
Socrates has bathed and put on shoes in honor of the occasion (174a3-4). Yet, he brings 
along an uninvited guest, Aristodemus, who is “always unshod” (173b2). Socrates then 
allows this uninvited and inappropriately dressed follower to arrive alone, while he 
himself stops along the way to think about something (174d4-7). Worse, he ignores his 
host’s request to arrive in time for dinner. After asking Aristodemus where Socrates is, 
Agathon sends a slave to bring him to his house. When the slave reports that Socrates is 
standing in a neighbor’s porch and refuses to leave, Agathon calls this behavior “strange” 
(ἄτοπον), and tells the slave to return to Socrates and take no refusal. However, the 
uninvited guest, Aristodemus, countermands his host’s order, telling the slave to leave 
Socrates alone (174e12-175b3). Repeatedly, Agathon attempts to send his slave to fetch 
Socrates and is prevented from doing so by the uninvited follower of Socrates (175c2-4). 
Not until the middle of dinner does the philosopher finally arrive (175c5-6). Socrates’ 
behavior is not only rude to Agathon, it also puts Aristodemus in the embarrassing and 
ridiculous (174e2) position of arriving at the party uninvited by his host, and without the 
guest who invited him. In going uninvited (ἄκλητος: 174b1, c7, c8) to the symposium, 
and experiencing something “ridiculous” (174e2) on his arrival, Aristodemus resembles 
the akletoi, the uninvited hangers-on of inferior social, physical and moral status, who 
earned a dinner by providing comic entertainment for the invited guests. 
 Socrates’ rude behavior as guest is highlighted by Agathon’s contrasting behavior 
as the model host. Agathon tells Aristodemus that he had intended to invite him (174e5-
8), and he asks Socrates to sit beside him when the philosopher finally arrives: “Come 
here . . . and recline beside me, Socrates, so that I can also benefit, by touching you, from 
the piece of wisdom that came to you in the porch. You’ve clearly found it and have it. 
Otherwise you wouldn’t have gone away” (175c7-d2). Socrates, instead of apologizing 
for being late and responding to his host’s request, replies: 
It would be a good thing, Agathon, if wisdom were the kind of thing that 
flowed from what is fuller into what is emptier in our case, if only we touch 
each other, like the water in cups which flows from the fuller into the 
emptier through the thread of wool. If wisdom too is like that, then I put a 
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high value on reclining beside you, because then I think it’s I who’ll be 
filled from your side with quantities of beautiful wisdom. Mine, I guess, 
will be an inferior sort of wisdom, or even a debatable one, existing as if in 
a dream; whereas yours is brilliant and promises much for the future, to 
judge from the brightness with which it shone out from you--and you still a 
young man--the other day, when it was displayed in full view with more 
than thirty thousand Greeks as witnesses (175d3-e6: translation Rowe 
1998.) 
 
 These actions and words are disdainful, according to Aristotle’s criteria, for they 
show that Socrates thinks nothing of his host’s wisdom. Socrates makes a joke of 
Agathon’s idea that wisdom can be transmitted by touch, and he ironically suggests that 
the young poet has greater wisdom than his own, because it shone brightly before a 
crowd of thirty thousand people. Coming from Socrates, who told Aristodemus that he 
stayed away from Agathon’s victory party on the day before because he feared the crowd 
(174a6-7), this is not praise, but disdain. Socrates’ mention of Agathon’s youth (175e5) is 
also a slighting allusion to his lack of mental insight, that, as Socrates tells Alcibiades, 
comes with age (219a2-4). In behaving in this way toward Agathon, Socrates could be 
interpreted as acting hubristically in that he commits a “serious assault on the honour of 
another, which is likely to cause shame, and lead to anger and attempts at revenge” 
(Fisher 1992, 1). Agathon’s reply is an expression of the anger and desire for revenge he 
would be justified in feeling in response to this kind of slighting: “You are hubristic 
[ὑβριστής εἶ], Socrates . . . . As for that, a little later you and I will go on trial concerning 
wisdom, with Dionysos as judge” (175e7-9). 
 Socrates continues to slight Agathon in their encounters before and after the 
poet’s speech (194a1-e3, 198a1-201c9). Before Agathon delivers his encomium of Eros, 
Socrates says that he fears he will be at a disadvantage after this speech. Agathon 
responds that Socrates is trying to bewitch and disturb him before he speaks (194a1-7). 
Socrates then expresses surprise that Agathon could be disturbed at the thought of 
speaking before a few people when he was not at all frightened before the crowd in the 
theater (194a8-b5). Agathon replies that it is more terrifying to speak before a few who 
have sense than before a crowd of the foolish (194b6-8). Socrates then says: “I know well 
that if you should meet any people you thought wise, you’d think more of them than of 
the many. But I suspect that we are not those wise people--for we were present there [at 
the theater] and were among the many” (194c2-5). In making this statement, Socrates 
slights Agathon by implicitly accepting the latter’s statement that the audience 
applauding Agathon at the theater was made up of fools. By including the symposiasts 
among this crowd of fools, he slights them also.  
 The conversation is interrupted at an interesting point. Questioned by Socrates, 
Agathon asserts that he would be ashamed before wise people if he thought he were 
doing something shameful (194c5-8). Socrates then asks him if he would not be ashamed 
before the many if he thought he were doing something shameful (194c9-10). At this 
point, Phaedrus tells Agathon to give his encomium of Eros before talking with Socrates, 
and Agathon complies (194d1-e3), thereby accepting the invitation of his audience to 
speak beautifully in performance instead of examining his behavior and seeking the truth 
by conversing with Socrates. The cross-examination, however, is merely postponed until 
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after Agathon’s speech. The text suggests that Socrates could have pressed Agathon to 
make even more humiliating confessions than he in fact does. In the reconstructed 
dialogue below, what Socrates and Agathon could have said is given in italics. 
 Socrates: You wouldn’t be ashamed before the many if you thought you were 
doing something shameful? (194c9-10) 
Agathon: Certainly I would, Socrates. 
Soc.: Do you consider it shameful to claim to know things that you don’t 
know? 
Ag.: Yes, I do. 
Soc. Then you would be ashamed to speak before the many and the few, 
claiming that you know about things you in fact know nothing about? 
Ag. Yes, I would. 
Soc. Well, Agathon, do you know something about Eros? 
Ag. Certainly I do. 
Soc. And do you speak about this topic before the many? 
Ag. Yes, I do, Socrates, when my plays are performed. My poetry is full of this 
subject. 
Soc. Come, then, Agathon. Tell me what Eros is like. 
Ag: Well, that’s just what I’m going to do. Here’s my encomium.  
[Agathon makes his speech (194e4-197e8), and after an interlude (198a1-
199c2) Socrates resumes questioning.] 
Soc.: Come, then, tell me this about Eros . . . (199c6-d1). 
[The elenchos continues (199d1-201b8).] 
Soc. Do you still agree that Eros is beautiful, if these things are so (201b9-
10)? 
Ag.: It seems likely, Socrates, that I didn’t know anything I was talking about 
then (201b11-12). 
Soc. Yet, when you presented your plays you spoke about this topic before the 
many, thereby claiming to know something about it. Not only that, but just 
now you made a speech about Eros to us few, claiming knowledge before us 
also. 
Ag. Yes, you’re right, Socrates. 
Soc. But didn’t you just now agree that you would be ashamed to speak before 
the many and the few, claiming that you knew things you in fact knew nothing 
about? 
Ag. I did. 
Soc. Then it follows that you should be ashamed of your poetry about Eros 
and of the encomium you gave just now. 
 
 In this reconstructed elenchos, Socrates convicts Agathon of doing something 
Agathon himself considers shameful, and thus demonstrates that the young man ought to 
be ashamed of himself.12 He thereby slights Agathon, showing that the achievement of 
which he is most proud--his ability to make beautiful speeches--is actually something 
shameful. When he leads Agathon to admit his ignorance (201b11-12) and his inability to 
                                                
12 Cf. Rowe, 1998, on 194d1-2. 
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refute Socrates (201c6-7), Socrates is victorious in the trial for wisdom predicted by 
Agathon (175e7-9). In refuting Agathon publicly, Socrates not only shows disdain for the 
young man’s ability to speak well, he also shames the poet and demonstrates his own 
superiority in argument. 
 Socrates’ behavior immediately after Agathon’s speech (198a1-199b5) has still 
other disdainful aspects. His very applause can be interpreted as mockery, and his use of 
extravagant praise, for example, when he remarks on the marvelous beauty of the last part 
of the speech (198b3-5), might be perceived as a form of insult.13 After joining all the 
other symposiasts (198a1) in applauding Agathon’s speech, Socrates attacks this very 
speech, thereby implying that the audience of symposiasts was, like the theater crowd, 
foolish to applaud an ignorant speaker. Socrates parodies Agathon’s style, employing 
mock-solemnity in addressing Eryximachus as “child of Akoumenos” (198a5), and 
asking the doctor if he, Socrates, “feared a fearless fear” when he was afraid to speak 
after Agathon (ἀδεὲς . . . δέος δεδιέναι: 198a5). The phrase “Gorgias’ head” (Γοργίου 
κεφαλήν 198c3), punning on “Gorgon’s head,” parodies Agathon’s Gorgianic style, as do 
the words “to speak in the speech” (λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ:198c4). Socrates’ statement that 
Agathon’s speech was “beautiful and variegated” (καλὸν . . . καὶ παντοδαπὸν 198b3) can 
also be viewed as an attack. 14 Moreover, in quoting Euripides’ well-known line--”my 
tongue swore but not my heart” (199a5-6, Hippolytus 612)--Socrates casts doubt on 
Agathon’s description of Eros by alluding to infamous counter-examples to the 
gentleness Agathon attributed to Eros in his speech: Phaedra’s disastrous passion for her 
stepson and the deceptive nature of promises in erotic contexts. Socrates also accuses 
Agathon of lying when he states that apparently it makes no difference whether an 
encomium is true or false (198e1-2). 
 Socrates not only slights Agathon’s ability to speak well, he also implies that he 
himself is superior in this regard. He asks: “Who would not have been stunned 
(ἐξεπλάγη)?” hearing Agathon’s beautiful words (198b5). The answer, of course, is 
“Socrates.” Socrates says that he thought that he would be unable to make an equally 
beautiful speech, and that as a result, “I almost ran away from shame” (198b6-c1). He 
feared that the “Gorgias’ head” of fine words would turn him into a speechless stone, and 
that he would be an object of laughter (198c1-6). One small word, however, saves him 
from this fate: Agathon’s speech almost (ὀλίγου 198b7) produced in Socrates the very 
same effects that Socrates’ words actually produce in Alcibiades, who feels shame and 
runs away when Socrates forces him to admit his deficiencies (216a4-b6). Socrates goes 
on to demonstrate his ability to resist Agathon’s power to stun, cause shame and render 
speechless by proceeding to speak at far greater length than any of the previous speakers. 
 Socrates also shows disdain in his interactions with Alcibiades. The young man’s 
speech recounts an exchange with Socrates that is very similar to the philosopher’s first 
encounter with Agathon. Like Agathon, Alcibiades wants to use physical proximity in 
order to get a share of Socrates’ wisdom. When Alcibiades offers his own physical 
beauty, of which he is marvelously proud (217a5-6), in exchange for being made better 
by Socrates (218c7-d5), the latter replies, “very ironically, and very much in his 
accustomed manner” (218d6-7): 
                                                
13 On Socrates’ use of extravagant praise see Nightingale 1995, 113-19. 
14 These examples are given by Bury, 1932, on 198a-c. 
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My dear Alcibiades, you must really be a person of no mean quality, if 
indeed what you say about me is actually true, and there is in me some 
power which could make you a better man; it’d be an irresistible beauty 
that you were observing in me, and one altogether superior to your own 
fine looks. If then because you see it you’re trying to enter into partnership 
with me and exchange beauty for beauty, you’re meaning to get the better 
of me in no small way; you’re trying to get hold of truly beautiful things in 
return for only apparently beautiful ones, and you have in mind a true 
exchange of “gold for bronze.” But you need to take a better look, my fine 
friend, in case you’re mistaken about me, and I’m really nothing. The 
sight of the mind, I assure you, first sees sharply when the sight of the 
eyes starts to fade from its prime; and you are still far away from that 
(218d7-219a4. Translation: Rowe 1998). 
 
 Just as Socrates slighted Agathon’s ability to speak beautifully, so he slights that 
of which Alcibiades is most proud: his physical beauty. Socrates again rejects the idea 
that physical proximity can convey wisdom. He belittles Alcibiades’ physical beauty, and 
he insults the young man by suggesting that Alcibiades is trying to cheat him and that he 
is so lacking in mental insight that he is not capable of seeing whether or not Socrates has 
great beauty of mind. Even while he suggests that Alcibiades lacks beauty of mind, 
Socrates implicitly claims a kind of mental superiority: as an older man, he has the 
mental acuity (“sight of the mind”) that Alcibiades lacks. Socrates’ behavior leads 
Alcibiades, like Agathon, to accuse Socrates of hybris (ὑβριστής εἶ: 215b7) and to bring 
him to trial before a jury of the symposiasts (219c3-6).  
 Alcibiades accuses Socrates of hybris in large part because of the sexual 
humiliation the philosopher inflicts. The young man behaves like both lover and beloved 
in his attempted seduction of Socrates, and is frustrated in both roles. He challenges 
(217c1), attacks (217c5) and plots against Socrates “just as a lover plots against a boy” 
(217c7-8; cf. 217d3). Alcibiades acts like the beloved, however, in attempting to 
“wound” Socrates as if with weapons when he offers his sexual favors (219b3-4), and in 
thinking that Socrates cares about his beauty and will, in exchange for sex, teach him all 
that he knows (217a2-5). Moreover, he refers to Socrates as his erastes, who can help him 
to become as good as possible, and he tells Socrates that he is ready to gratify him 
sexually (218c7-d3). Socrates, however, does not respond to the young man’s advances 
in the conventional way, but, in refusing the role of erastes, reduces him to a state of 
slavery (219e3-4) and perplexity (219d8-e1, 219e3), in which he can neither be angry 
with Socrates nor win him over (219d7-e5). Humiliated by the philosopher’s resistance, 
Alcibiades concludes that although Socrates appears to have eros for the beautiful and to 
be stunned by them (216d2-3), he really disdains (καταφρονεῖ: 216d8) their beauty. 
Indeed, Socrates has disdain not only for physical beauty but also for wealth and honor, 
and “he thinks that all such possessions are worth nothing and that we are nothing” 
(216d7-e4). The young man thought that Socrates was serious about his beauty (217a2-
3), but it turned out that the philosopher instead disdained it (219c4-5). In response to 
these slights, Alcibiades accuses Socrates of dishonoring him (219d4), and of hybris and 
arrogance in laughing at his beauty (219c4-6). Many other close associates of Socrates, 
according to Alcibiades, have experienced a similar kind of hybris from him (222a7-b4). 
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 Socrates can also be perceived as acting slightingly and hubristically in 
compelling Alcibiades to agree that, although he is very deficient, he neglects himself 
and instead takes care of the affairs of the Athenians (216a4-6). The philosopher, 
moreover, produces in Alcibiades something of which no one would have thought him 
capable: shame (216a8-b2). As a result, Alcibiades flees from Socrates like a runaway 
slave (δραπετεύω), overcome by desire for honor from the many, but again feels shame 
when he meets the philosopher (216b3-6). Alcibiades feels anger as a result, for he 
sometimes wishes Socrates were dead. He realizes, however, that this would cause him 
even more pain, and concludes: “I don’t know what to do with this man” (216c1-3).  
 Socrates also shows disdain in his other interactions with both Agathon and 
Alcibiades. At the end of Socrates’ speech, Alcibiades arrives, drunk and late, and 
crowns the young poet with a wreath of ribbons, calling him “wisest and most beautiful” 
(212e6-8). Alcibiades then notices Socrates and takes some of the ribbons from 
Agathon’s head to crown the philosopher: 
“Now, Agathon,” he said, “give me back some of the ribbons, so that I 
may also crown the most marvelous head of this man, and he won’t blame 
me for crowning you and not him, when he wins the victory in words over 
all people, not just the day before yesterday, as you did, but always.” 
While he spoke, he took some of the ribbons, crowned Socrates, and 
reclined. (213d8-e6) 
 
 This scene has comic overtones, for after the drunken Alcibiades almost sits on 
Socrates, whom he accuses of ambushing him, Socrates asks Agathon to defend him 
against Alcibiades if he becomes violent (213a3-d6). However, the comedy can be 
perceived as having hubristic overtones, suggesting an assault on Agathon’s honor. 
Alcibiades not only proclaims Socrates winner of the first prize in words, thereby 
demoting Agathon to second place, he also does this at a symposium given by Agathon to 
celebrate the poet’s first victory at a tragic competition (173a5-6).  Although Socrates 
himself does not take away the wreath, in keeping it he might be seen as offending 
against Agathon’s honor. Agathon is his host, and, as Homer’s Odysseus says, one should 
not compete with one’s host (Od. 8.204-211). Moreover, in keeping another’s prize, 
Socrates dishonors Agathon in the way Agamemnon dishonors Achilles, who says: “He 
dishonored me; for he has himself taken my prize and keeps it” (Il. 1.356), lines quoted 
by Aristotle in his discussion of hybris (Rhet. 1378b32, quoted above). In the 
Symposium, in which Achilles is repeatedly mentioned (179e1, 180a4, b4, 208d3, 
221c6), the crowning of Socrates might well recall the Iliadic precedent. 
 At the end of the dialogue, Socrates states that Alcibiades’ real purpose in telling 
his story was to make trouble between Agathon and Socrates by means of the warning 
against Socrates with which the speech concluded. What Alcibiades wants, says Socrates, 
is for Socrates to love Alcibiades alone, and for Agathon to be loved by Alcibiades alone 
(222c4-d3). Socrates calls on Agathon to see to it that Alcibiades does not succeed in 
setting Socrates and Agathon at variance (222d1, 222d6). At this point, the three men 
dispute about the seating arrangement. Agathon, Alcibiades, and Socrates have been 
reclining on the same couch, in that order, but Agathon now offers to sit beside Socrates, 
who invites him to do so (222e3-5). In this new arrangement, the order would be: 
Alcibiades, Socrates, Agathon. When Alcibiades suggests that Agathon instead sit 
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between them, Socrates objects on the grounds that he needs to sit to the right of Agathon 
in order to praise him. Agathon is delighted at the prospect of being praised by Socrates, 
and gets up to sit beside him. Alcibiades now admits defeat in the contest over Agathon, 
saying that no one can get a share of the beautiful people when Socrates is present, for the 
philosopher is resourceful in inventing persuasive words (222e6-223b2). 
 This scene represents Socrates as a comic figure, participating in a game of 
musical chairs and competing for Agathon’s favors. It also portrays him as acting in ways 
that could be construed as hubristic. Alcibiades has just described Socrates as an 
eromenos (222b3-4), and the narrators of the dialogue corroborate this by saying that 
Alcibiades still seems to be in love with Socrates (222c2-3). Instead of acting as 
Alcibiades’ eromenos, however, the philosopher casts himself in the role of erastes 
(222d1). He thus once again acts in a way that Alcibiades calls hubristic, in leading 
people to think he is an erastes while actually being the eromenos (222a7-b4). Socrates 
also casts Alcibiades in the role of erastes of Agathon (222d2), and humiliates him in this 
role as well, by himself playing the role of successful erastes in relation to Agathon. 
When he persuades the beautiful Agathon to sit next to himself instead of beside 
Alcibiades, Socrates demonstrates his superiority in the erotic competition.  
 Just as Socrates’ cross-examination of Agathon was interrupted by Phaedrus, so 
the philosopher is prevented from praising Agathon by the arrival of a crowd of revelers, 
who compel the symposiasts to drink much wine (223b2-6). In this scene, Socrates is 
once again judged by Dionysos to be victorious in the trial for wisdom alluded to by 
Agathon at 175e7-9. Socrates shows his superiority in three Dionysian activities: 
drinking, drama and love.  After monopolizing Agathon, the most beautiful man present, 
he drinks all the rest of the symposiasts under the table, demonstrating the truth of 
Alcibiades’ statement that the present occasion would be a test of his ability to withstand 
the effects of wine (220a4-6). He proves his superiority in drama by compelling Agathon 
and Aristophanes to agree that the man who has the skill to compose tragedies is also able 
to write comedies (223d2-6). He thus shows that he knows more about drama than they 
do, and also demonstrates that they, who compose in only one dramatic genre, do not do 
so by means of expert knowledge.15 The end of the dialogue, then, could be taken to 
imply that Socrates once again slights Agathon’s ability to speak well, and at the same 
time hubristically demonstrates his own superiority.  
 In sum, throughout the dialogue, Socrates acts contrary to sympotic conventions. 
He says things that lead Agathon to charge him with hybris; he ridicules his host; he 
creates strife between Agathon and Alcibiades, and he is excessively sober. An orderly 
symposium, from which hybris is excluded, produces friendship and peace. Socrates, in 
contrast, might appear to introduce strife and jealousy, hybris and disdain. 
 
4. Divine Images of Virtue 
 Socrates’ comic and satyr-like traits are only one aspect of his persona. 
Alcibiades’ speech portrays Socrates not only as hubristic, but also as exhibiting the 
virtues (219d4-7), and as using his virtues to benefit the young man. Socrates also 
benefits Agathon, who, in contrast to Alcibiades, appears to be a model interlocutor, who 
learns from Socrates’ disdainful treatment. 
                                                
15 Noted by Rowe 1998, on 223d2-5. 
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 According to Alcibiades, Socrates’ courage is shown by his actions in war 
(220d5-221c1), and his endurance is attested by his extraordinary resistance to pleasure 
and pain. Socrates resists the effects of wine (220a4-6; cf. 176c3-5), the need for sleep 
(220c3-d5; cf. 223d6-12), the temptations of money (219e1-2), and the effects of hunger 
and cold (219e7-220a1, 220a6-c1). His sophrosyne is evidenced by his remarkable ability 
to spend the night in Alcibiades’ arms without having sexual relations with the beautiful 
youth (219b3-d2). Above all, Alcibiades attributes to Socrates exceptional understanding 
(φρόνησιν: 219d6), and it is this virtue that he himself wants to acquire (217a2-6, 218d1-
3). Alcibiades also acknowledges Socrates’ superior understanding when he says that he 
cannot contradict Socrates. He knows that he should do what the philosopher bids, but 
fails to act on this belief because he is overcome by desire for honor from the many 
(216b3-5). 
 In Alcibiades’ story, Socrates uses his courage for Alcibiades’ benefit, saving the 
life of the young man, along with his weapons, and giving up to Alcibiades the prize for 
valor that he, Socrates, deserves (220d6-e4). The philosopher does not share his 
understanding with Alcibiades in the way a lover is traditionally thought to impart 
wisdom to a beloved, but he does use it to care for the young man’s soul. Socrates 
compels Alcibiades to agree that he is neglecting his own soul to engage in political 
affairs (216a4-6). He talks to Alcibiades and spends the day with him (217b6-7), 
discourses with him far into the night (217d4), and offers to consider with him the best 
course of action (219a8-b2). Socrates also shares meals with Alcibiades during the war at 
Potideia (219e7), during which more philosophical discourses undoubtedly take place. 
The shame that Alcibiades feels as a result of his conversations with Socrates leads him, 
at least temporarily, to recognize his faults and to want to change his way of life (216a8-
b6). That Socrates’ sophrosyne benefits Alcibiades is implied by the latter’s statement 
that Socrates’ relations with him are like those of a father or older brother (219c7-d2). In 
the Apology, the reader will recall, Socrates neglects his own affairs, going around to 
each man in private like a father or an older brother, persuading the Athenians to take 
care of virtue (31b3-5). Alcibiades acknowledges Socrates’ superior virtue, saying that 
the failed seduction made him admire the philosopher’s courage, sophrosyne, 
understanding and endurance, but he characterizes this virtuous behavior as, 
paradoxically, a form of hybris (219c5). 
 Agathon’s interactions with Socrates indicate that the poet, like Alcibiades, thinks 
that Socrates has superior understanding, which Agathon does not hesitate to call wisdom 
(tou sophou: 175c8; cf. 175e2). Although Socrates slights Agathon, his interactions with 
the poet can also be interpreted as providing evidence that he cares deeply about seeking 
wisdom and about leading others to do so also.  
 Socrates is a rude guest, who acts in a strange, unconventional, way (ἄτοπον: 
175a10). However, he does so not because he enjoys insulting his host and putting 
Aristodemus in an embarrassing situation, but because he is engaged in philosophical 
thought (174d4-5), which he values more highly than obeying social conventions. When 
Agathon asks to share Socrates’ wisdom by touching him, Socrates’ reply slights 
Agathon’s achievements, but it also attempts to correct the young man’s false ideas. True 
wisdom, Socrates says, is not conveyed by touch, and it does not consist in the ability to 
win the praises of crowds, but in the recognition that all human beings, including 
Socrates, have “an inferior sort of wisdom, or even a debatable one, existing as if in a 
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dream” (175e2-4). Agathon accuses Socrates of hybris, but he also shows his willingness 
to learn when he says that Dionysos will be the judge concerning wisdom. 
 Socrates’ interactions with Agathon before the poet gives his encomium (194a-e) 
also show that he wants to benefit Agathon by correcting false beliefs. When Agathon 
says that it is more terrifying to speak before a few who have sense than before a crowd 
of the foolish (194b6-8), Socrates’ reply, “I certainly wouldn’t be acting nobly, Agathon, 
if I thought you were at all boorish” (194c1-2), indicates genuine respect for the young 
poet. After Agathon makes his speech, Socrates, like a good teacher, prefaces his critical 
questioning with praise: “Indeed, dear Agathon, it seemed to me that you began your 
speech well, saying that it was first necessary to demonstrate what characteristics Eros 
has, and after that to discuss his works. I very much admire this beginning. Come then, 
since you recounted beautifully and magnificently what he is like in other respects, tell 
me this also about Eros. . . “ (199c3-d1). Moreover, Socrates’ parody of Agathon’s style, 
his criticism of the contents of the speech, and his cross-examination can all be seen as 
part of an attempt to produce a beneficial humility and self-awareness that is the 
beginning of wisdom. Socrates treats Agathon just as he does Lysis (Lysis 210d4-e5), 
and Alcibiades (Alcibiades 1, Symposium 216a4-b6), inducing shame in order to cast out 
false opinion. In Agathon’s case, this is the false opinion that fine rhetoric is more 
important than truth. In showing Agathon that he does not know what he thinks he 
knows, Socrates applies the lesson he will later say he learned from his teacher (204a4-7). 
Lack of learning (ἀµαθία), according to Diotima, is harmful because it leads one to think 
that one is beautiful, good and sensible (phronimon) without being so. People desire what 
they lack only if they know that they are deficient. Just as Socrates leads Alcibiades to 
admit that he is deficient (216a5), so he shows Agathon that he lacks the true beauty of 
speech he thought he had, and thus leads him to desire to become able to speak truthfully. 
 The interaction between Socrates and Agathon after the elenchos provides 
persuasive evidence that Socrates benefits Agathon, and that Agathon realizes this: 
 And Agathon said, “It seems likely, Socrates, that I didn’t know 
anything I was talking about then.” 
 “But indeed you spoke beautifully, Agathon,” he said. “But tell me 
one little thing more. Don’t good things [τἀγαθά] seem to you to be 
beautiful also?” 
 “They do.” 
 “If, then, Eros is deficient in beautiful things, and good things are 
beautiful, he would also be deficient in good things [τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνδεὴς 
εἴη].” 
 “I wouldn’t be able to contradict you, Socrates,” he said, “but let it 
be just as you say.” 
 “You aren’t able to contradict the truth, beloved16 Agathon,” he 
said, “but it’s not difficult to contradict Socrates.” (201b11-c9) 
 
 This exchange ends in a remarkably friendly way. Agathon does not react to the 
elenchos as so many of Socrates’ interlocutors do, by becoming angry with Socrates, nor 
does he repeat his earlier charge of hybris. Instead, he readily acknowledges his own 
                                                
16 Reading φιλούμενε, defended by Dover 1980, on 201c9, and (with caution) Rowe 1998, on 201c8-9. 
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ignorance and agrees with Socrates’ conclusion. Agathon admits that he cannot contradict 
Socrates (201c6), just as Alcibiades does (216b3), but unlike Alcibiades (216b4-6), 
Agathon does not go on to say that other forces deter him from acting in accord with his 
admission. Socrates continues to show consideration for Agathon when he addresses him 
as “beloved” and goes on to recount his own interactions with Diotima, in which he 
himself was refuted after saying things about Eros similar to those Agathon has just 
asserted (201e3-7). In the passage quoted above, Socrates concludes his exchange with a 
punning compliment to Agathon. The young poet had portrayed Eros in his own image, 
as most beautiful (195a7), most tender (195e8, 196a1, cf. 195d1), living among the 
softest things (195e8, cf. 195d7, e3, e7), and producing kinship, gentleness, and good will 
among people (197d1-5). In punning references to his own name, Agathon said that Eros 
is “good” (agathos: 197d5), a “good poet” (poietês. . . agathos : 196e4), and a god who 
takes care of the good (epimelês agathôn: 197d7-8). 17 The same pun was introduced at 
the beginning of the dialogue, when Socrates, on his way to Agathon’s house, quoted the 
proverb: “The good [agathoi] go of their own accord to the feasts of the good [agathôn]” 
(ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόµατοι ἀγαθοί: 174b4-5).18  In the context of these 
precedents, when Socrates says that Eros is deficient in (or needs) good things (Ἔρως . . . 
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνδεὴς εἴη: 201c5), he is simultaneously refuting Agathon and paying him a 
compliment by stating that Eros is in need of Agathon. This pun also helps to explain why 
Socrates addresses Agathon as “beloved.” In identifying him with the things Eros needs, 
Socrates casts Agathon in the role of beloved, a role that Agathon’s speech already gave 
to his soft and tender Eros (see 204c1-5). Agathon’s response, “I wouldn’t be able to 
contradict you, Socrates...but let it be just as you say” (201c6-7), shows that he accepts 
the compliment as gracefully as the defeat. In addition to being a good host and poet 
Agathon is a good interlocutor, in that he learns from his defeat. 
 That Agathon has learned from his interactions with Socrates is also apparent 
from their interactions at the end of the dialogue. In being persuaded to sit next to 
Socrates by the philosopher’s offer of praise, Agathon reenacts the situation at the 
beginning of the dialogue. In their first encounter, Agathon called Socrates hubristic after 
the philosopher denied that wisdom can be imparted by means of physical proximity and 
mockingly praised Agathon’s ability to speak well at the theater (175d3-e7). Now, 
however, Agathon changes his seat in order to sit next to Socrates and be praised by him, 
thus reproducing the situation at the beginning of the dialogue. In being eager for 
Socrates’ praise, even though he has learned that this praise is mixed with criticism, 
Agathon, shows that he accepts the judgment of Dionysos concerning wisdom (175e7-
10). 
 
5. Marsyas and Eros 
 Alcibiades, whose encomium of Socrates mixes praise with blame for hybris 
(222a7-8), is perplexed by Socrates (οὔτε . . . ηὐπόρουν: 219d8-e1, ἠπόρουν: 219e3 ), 
and says that he “does not know what to do with the man” (216c3). The dialogue raises a 
similar problem for the reader who attempts to understand the combination of 
                                                
17The last pun is noted by Rowe, 1998, on 197d8. 
18 Discussed by Bury 1932, 8-9; Hug 1876, 12-13; Lowanstam 1985, 86-87; Rowe 1998, on 174b3-c5. Cf. 
Aristophanes’ Frogs 84. 
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extraordinary virtue with disdainful and hubristic behavior that characterizes the Socrates 
portrayed by the multiple narrators of the Symposium. Modern readers must begin by 
realizing that Socrates’ disdain, and perhaps even his apparently hubristic behavior, 
would have seemed less problematic to Plato’s contemporaries than it does to us. Within 
the context of ancient Greek ethical values, disdain is not only perfectly compatible with, 
but is actually essential to extraordinary virtue. Disdain for inferior objects is sometimes 
presented in Plato’s dialogues as an essential concomitant of virtue: Achilles disdains 
death (κατεφρόνησεν: Ap. 28c3), and philosophers think little (ὀλιγωροῦσιν) of the body 
(Phdo. 68c11-12).19 Aristotle’s account of magnanimity (µεγαλοψυχία) in NE 4.3 and EE 
3.5 also provides important information about fourth-century views on disdain as a 
characteristic of the virtuous person.  
 According to Aristotle, to disdain something (καταφρονεῖν) is to think slightingly 
of it, to give it little value in comparison with other things (Rhet. 1378b15-17). Disdain 
can be a sign of arrogance, but it can also be a virtuous attitude if it involves giving an 
accurate valuation to objects that are in fact inferior. The magnanimous man’s disdain is 
virtuous because he combines extraordinary virtue with an accurate assessment of his 
own merits (NE 1123b2). According to Aristotle, disdain is not only compatible with 
virtue, but is a direct consequence of it. Every virtue makes people disdainful of things 
that appear important contrary to reason: the courageous person is disdainful of dangers, 
the moderate person of great pleasures. Because he has extraordinary virtue, and places a 
high value on great things, disdain of lesser things is characteristic of the magnanimous 
man (EE 1232a38-b10). The magnanimous man may even show his disdain by speaking 
hubristically (NE 1125a8-9). Although some scholars have argued that Aristotle’s 
magnanimous man is based, at least in part, on the historical Socrates, there is no firm 
evidence to support this view.20 Nevertheless, the undeniable similarities between 
Aristotle’s magnanimous man and Socrates in the Symposium can help modern readers to 
understand that Socrates’ disdain for the things others honor (216d7-e4, 219c3-5) and 
perhaps even his apparently hubristic behavior might be explained as justified by and 
essential to his extraordinary virtue. 
 Before we identify Socrates with the magnanimous man, however, we would do 
well to heed Alcibiades’ warning against attempting to stereotype Socrates. The 
philosopher is so unique and strange (ἀτοπίαν: 215a2, 221d2) as to be unlike any other 
model, ancient or modern (221c4-d6). Socrates cannot be compared to Achilles, Nestor 
or Antenor (221c6-8); he is “much more marvelous” than Marsyas (215b8) and much 
more invulnerable than Ajax (219e1-2). In describing Socrates’ behavior, Alcibiades 
quotes Aristophanes (221b3 adapts Clouds 362). The fact that this verse is a description 
of Socrates himself indicates that the philosopher, like Achilles and Ajax, has been 
immortalized in poetry. Socrates sets his own standards and makes his own traditions. 
 If Alcibiades’ Socrates resembles Aristotle’s magnanimous man in having 
extraordinary virtue and in being disdainful, the dialogue also provides evidence to 
support Alcibiades’ and Agathon’s accusations of hybris, for the philosopher can be seen 
as dishonoring and shaming others. Nevertheless, the text gives many indications that this 
                                                
19 I owe these references to Pakaluk 2003. 
20 The view of Deman (1942, 54-57), followed by Gauthier (1951, 116-17) that Aristotle’s magnanimous 
man is modeled on the historical Socrates is opposed by Dirlmeier (1991, 370-371). 
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strange man is also unlike both the magnanimous man and the hubristic man of 
Aristotle’s definition (Rhetoric 1378b23-35, quoted above, section 2). The magnanimous 
man “thinks himself worthy of great things” (NE 1123b2), especially honor (1123b15-
24), and the hubristic man of Aristotle’s definition dishonors others in order to get 
pleasure by proving his own superiority. Socrates, however, disclaims superior virtue and 
wisdom, does not think that he deserves to be honored, slights himself as well as others, 
and gives no sign that he enjoys humiliating others. The philosopher claims to be 
ignorant of everything, and to know nothing (216d3-4), and he recounts Diotima’s 
belittling remarks about his intellectual abilities (204b1, 207c2-4, 209e5-210a4).  He 
refers mockingly to Agathon’s wisdom before the crowd at the theater, but he also calls 
his own wisdom inferior or doubtful (175d3-e6). When Socrates denies that Agathon’s 
audience was made up of wise people, he includes himself in the number of fools (194c1-
5). The superior insight of maturity to which he alludes in his conversation with 
Alcibiades is that of knowing one’s own worthlessness (219a1-4). In rejecting the prize 
for valor (220e2-7), Socrates might be thought to disclaim courage; he certainly shows 
that he himself does not desire honor. In this case, far from hubristically dishonoring 
Alcibiades to prove his own superiority, Socrates enhances the young man’s reputation at 
the expense of his own. Socrates’ suggestion that Alcibiades may be trying to exchange 
bronze for gold (218e5-219a1) might be taken as a disclaimer of sophrosyne: if 
Alcibiades’ beauty is mere bronze, there is little virtue in resisting it. Alcibiades accuses 
Socrates of laughing at him (219c4), but the philosopher’s slighting references to his own 
virtues are inconsistent with the hubristic laughter that comes from enjoyment of his own 
superiority. 
 How, then, are we to understand this strange and unique persona, who is neither a 
magnanimous nor a hubristic man, but who appears to share certain traits with both? 
According to Alcibiades, the strangeness of Socrates and his words can only be captured 
in the images of the sileni and satyrs (221d1-6) that represent the philosopher as having a 
deceptive (222b3) outer, hubristic, satyr-like aspect, and an inner, divinely virtuous 
aspect. Alcibiades’ interpretation of the persona of Socrates, cannot, however be taken at 
face value, for the dialogue gives the reader good reasons for questioning Alcibiades. 
Soon after awarding Socrates the victory in speech, he accuses him of lying: “Did 
Socrates persuade you of anything he said just now? Don’t you know that it’s just the 
opposite of what he said?” (214c8-d2). Alcibiades’ veracity is also open to doubt. He 
swears to be telling the truth, attributing this fact to his drunken state (217e3-4; cf. 212e9-
213a1), and he frequently challenges Socrates to deny that he speaks the truth (214e10, 
217b2-3, 219c2, 220e4). Socrates does not contest anything in Alcibiades’ story except 
his claim to be drunk, saying, immediately after Alcibiades’ story: “You seem to me to be 
sober, Alcibiades” (222c3-4). If, as Alcibiades claims, there is truth in wine, a sober 
Alcibiades may be lying. Furthermore, Alcibiades admits that he is in a state of aporia 
about Socrates (219d7-e5). Just as the perplexity of Socrates’ interlocutors in other 
dialogues is the result of an inability to reconcile apparent inconsistencies, 21 so 
Alcibiades’ aporia results from the failure to understand the combination of hybris and 
virtue that he claims Socrates exhibits. In comparing Socrates to a silenus statue that 
opens up to reveal divine images, Alcibiades grasps part of the truth. His audience within 
                                                
21 On aporia and atopia see Blondell 2002, 73 and n.102. 
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the dialogue, however, and Plato’s readers, who, unlike Alcibiades, have heard Socrates’ 
speech about Eros, are in a better position than is Alcibiades himself to understand the 
way in which the image, with its unique combination of virtue with hybris, represents the 
truth about Socrates. 
  Alcibiades does not identify the gods within the silenus, but two candidates are 
prominent in the dialogue. As the god of the symposium and of the theater, Dionysos 
presides over the symposium in honor of Agathon’s theatrical victory. The god is invoked 
as judge by Agathon (175e9), and is said to be one of Aristophanes’ main concerns 
(177e1-2). Moreover, the followers of this god are satyrs. 22 Another divinity, however, is 
much more important in the Symposium: Eros, the subject of the first six speeches in the 
dialogue. Eros is also appropriate in this context because Socrates replaces Eros as the 
subject of Alcibiades’ encomium (214b9-d8), within which the philosopher is 
characterized in erotic terms. It is a plausible inference, then, that Alcibiades intends his 
audience to identify one of the gods within the statue as Eros. 
 The symposiasts, who, unlike Alcibiades, have heard Socrates’ speech, have still 
other reasons for identifying the god within the silenus with an Eros whom Socrates 
resembles. As has often been noted, the Socrates portrayed by Alcibiades and others in 
the Symposium has much in common with Eros in the speech attributed to Diotima. Both 
are daimonion (Eros: 202d13; Socrates: 219c1), lack beauty (Eros: 203c6-7; Socrates: 
215b4-6, 216d4), are unshod (Eros: 203d1; Socrates:174a4, 220b6), live outside and in 
doorways (Eros: 203d1-3; Socrates: 220c3-d4, 175a8). Socrates and Eros both contrive 
plots so as to associate with the beautiful (Eros: 203d6, Socrates: 213c4: 223a6-9). Both 
are courageous (Eros: 203d5, 212b8; Socrates: 219d5, 220d5-221c1) and resourceful 
(Eros: 203d7, Socrates: 223a7), and both are characterized as magicians and 
spellbinders.23 Both are erotic with respect to beauty (Eros: 204b3; Socrates: 216d2-3), 
and both Socrates and the erastes have disdain for lesser objects (erastes: 210b5-6, c5-6; 
Socrates: 219c4-5). Just as Eros desires what he lacks (200a9-b1), and eros causes people 
to desire what they lack (205a5-7), so Socrates causes Alcibiades to desire to remedy his 
deficiencies (215e7-216a6). 
 Alcibiades’ audience would also have recognized an important difference, of 
which Alcibiades himself cannot be aware, between Alcibiades’ Socrates and Diotima’s 
Eros. According to Socrates’ speech, Eros is not the eromenos but the lover (204c1-6), 
and therefore lacks beauty, goodness, understanding (204a5), and the other virtues. That 
Diotima’s Eros lacks virtue is shown, above all, by his characterization as a philosopher, 
someone who is between wisdom and lack of learning (ἀµαθία), and who recognizes his 
own deficiencies (203d7-204b5). In contrast, Alcibiades’ Socrates is the eromenos 
(222b3-4, 222c2-3), who contains very beautiful (217a1) images of virtue (222a4), 
having extraordinary courage (219d5, 220d6-221c1), endurance (219d7, 220a1), 
understanding (219d6), and sophrosyne (219d5).  
 When he characterizes the “inner” Socrates as beautiful and virtuous, Alcibiades, 
who was not present when Socrates characterized Eros as the lover instead of the 
beloved, shows that he misunderstands Socrates. Socrates in the Symposium, like 
Diotima’s Eros, is not virtuous or wise, nor does he have the “immense beauty” (218e2) 
                                                
22 Eisner 1982, 114 argues that Dionysos is a god within the statue.  
23 Eros: 203d8; Socrates: 194a5, 215c1, 215d5-6. 
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of the eromenos; he is instead between virtue and vice, knowledge and lack of learning. 
Socrates knows nothing except erotics (177d7-8), that is, like Eros, he knows that he is 
deficient (175e2-4, 219a2).24 Socrates, like Eros, is a philosopher (218a4-5, 218b3), who 
desires wisdom because he recognizes that he lacks it. Socrates’ ignorance (ἄγνοια), then, 
is not merely a schema (216d4), a deceptive outer covering, but part of his true erotic 
nature. Although Alcibiades mistakenly attributes virtue to Socrates, he does grasp an 
important part of the truth about Socrates. Just as Socrates has an inferior and doubtful 
kind of wisdom (175e2-4), so he possesses an inferior kind of virtue. Socrates has the 
kind of courage Eros has, in that he desires beauty and pursues it; he has endurance in 
that his disdain for inferior objects leads him to resist the pleasures and pains associated 
with them, and he has understanding in that he knows his own ignorance. He also has 
sophrosyne in that he has little regard for physical beauty compared to wisdom and 
beauty of soul. The “images” Alcibiades sees within the silenus are not virtue, but objects 
between virtue and vice, statues (ἀγάλµατα) of the god Eros.25  
 Alcibiades’ mistake about Socrates is apparent in his narration of the attempted 
seduction. When the young man asks Socrates to be a helper in making him as good as 
possible (218d1-3), the philosopher replies that Alcibiades may be mistaken if he thinks 
that Socrates has within him an “immense beauty” (218e2). Socrates goes on to tell 
Alcibiades: “In the future, considering things, we will do whatever appears best to us, 
about these and other matters” (219a8-b2). Because he mistakes the erastes of wisdom 
and beauty for the virtuous and beautiful eromenos, Alcibiades fails to recognize that this 
“shared search” for wisdom is the very help he asks for.26 Indeed, in the exhortation 
Alcibiades did not hear, Socrates explained that Eros is a helper (212b3) of humans in 
their search for the object of their desires: 
I am persuaded, and I try to persuade others also that one could not easily 
acquire a better co-worker . . . than Eros. For this reason, I say that every 
man must honor Eros and I myself honor and especially cultivate erotic 
matters and exhort others to do so also. Both now and always I praise the 
power and courage of Eros as much as I am able (212b2-8). 
 
 Although Alcibiades merely leaves his audience to infer who the gods within the 
statue are, he explicitly identifies the “outer” Socrates with a satyr or silenus, and, in 
particular, with the satyr Marsyas. Socrates, he says, resembles a satyr, or Marsyas 
(215b3-6), in being hubristic (215b6-7; cf. 221e3-4), and in being an aulos-player who 
enchants people and invents tunes (215b8-d1). Alcibiades also connects Socrates’ satyr-
like characteristics with his erotic nature and his ignorance: “You see that Socrates is 
erotically disposed toward the beautiful and that he is always around them and that he is 
stunned by them, and again that he is ignorant of everything and knows nothing, as far as 
his appearance goes. Isn’t this silenus-like?”27 Alcibiades is making a statement about 
                                                
24 Cf. Gould 1963, 44-45; Osborne 1994, 93-94; Rowe 1998, on 177d7-e1; Nightingale 1995, 123-29. 
25 The ἀγάλματα are not “mere images” (Reeve 1992, 112-13) but statues honoring a god (Blundell 1992, 
120-21). 
26 Shared search: Gill 2002, 150 and 165 n16. 
27 216d2-4. I translate the text of Bury 1932 and Rowe 1998. 
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Socrates’ satyr-like physical appearance (σχῆµα), which, according to Greek theories of 
physiognomy, is an indication of ignorance, stupidity, and lechery.28  
 In characterizing Socrates as satyr-like in outward appearance, Alcibiades once 
again grasps only part of the truth. The young man, who missed Socrates’ speech, cannot 
recognize that the same satyr-like traits he attributes to Socrates also characterize 
Diotima’s Eros. Socrates’ satyr-like appearance marks him as erotic and ignorant (216d2-
4), and Eros is ignorant, in a state between lack of learning and wisdom (203e5). Eros 
lacks beauty (203c6-7), and so do the satyrs that Socrates resembles. Socrates’ words 
appear laughable, like a satyr’s skin (221e2-222a1), and Diotima’s Eros, with his absurd 
birth story, is a comic figure (203b2-d8). According to Alcibiades, Socrates is satyr-like 
in being hubristic (215b6-7), and his hybris consists in laughing at and disdaining the 
young man’s beauty (219c3-5). Hybris is not explicitly associated with Diotima’s Eros. 
However, because the daimon is identified with the lover (τὸ ἐρῶν: 204c1-6), it is a 
reasonable inference that he, like the human erastes, has the disdain for a beautiful body 
(210b5-6) that Alcibiades calls hybris when Socrates exhibits it. Eros is a resourceful 
contriver (203d6-7), and Socrates resembles the satyr Marsyas in being a resourceful 
inventor of tunes (215c2-3; cf. 223a8: εὐπόρως). Eros is shoeless, homeless and sleeps 
out of doors (203d1-3), and Alcibiades’ Socrates is shoeless and spends time out of doors 
(220b6, c3-d4). Although satyrs are not explicitly said to share these characteristics in the 
Symposium, they are essential traits of these half-bestial creatures, who have hooves 
instead of feet and who live in the wild. Eros is bold, impetuous and a hunter (203d5), 
and satyrs are commonly represented in the visual arts as bold pursuers of sexual objects. 
Socrates, according to Alcibiades, is also a pursuer of the beautiful (213c4-5, 216d2-3, 
223a6-9). Finally, like Eros (202d13) and Socrates (219c1), a satyr is commonly 
represented as a daimon.29 
Alcibiades’ audience, and Plato’s readers, then, are able to recognize what 
Alcibiades cannot, that the outer satyr in many ways resembles the inner god (or rather, 
daimon), and that Socrates resembles both. Diotima’s Eros and Alcibiades’ Marsyas, 
daimon and satyr, both exemplify the same characteristics of the erotic philosopher: 
someone whose eros for true beauty leads him to be resourceful and energetic in pursuing 
it, without regard for convention, and to disdain such inferior objects as Alcibiades’ 
physical beauty, the rhetorical beauty of Agathon’s speech, and Socrates’ own inferior 
and doubtful kind of wisdom and virtue.  
 One particularly significant way in which Socrates resembles both Eros and 
Marsyas is in being a magician.30 The philosopher uses binding spells (κατεχόµεθα: 
215d6, cf. 218a6-7) to enslave (215e6-7, 219e3-4), give pain (218a2-5), and produce 
shame (216b2). More specifically, Socrates’ words are a kind of love magic, that seek to 
create, in a young man’s soul that is not without natural ability (νέου ψυχῆς µὴ ἀφυοῦς: 
218a6) eros not for a person but for the virtues that Socrates himself does not possess.31 
As Socrates says, “I honor and especially cultivate Eros, and I exhort others to do so 
                                                
28 Socrates’ physical appearance: Blondell 2002, 73; Kahn 1996, 11; Zanker 1995, 32-39. The evidence 
given by the physiognomer Zopyrus is collected by Rossetti 1980. 
29 Seaford 1988, 32, and 197 on Eur. Cyc. 495-502. 
30 Eros 203d8; Marsysas and Socrates: 215c1-d1. See further, Belfiore 1980. 
31 Socrates and love magic Faraone 1999. 
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also” (212b6-7). When Alcibiades listens to Socrates he falls under the philosopher’s 
spell and thinks that his present life is not worth living (215e7-216a2). In thus 
recognizing his own deficiencies (πολλοῦ ἐνδεὴς ὢν: 216a5) , a lesson reinforced by 
what Alcibiades later calls Socrates’ hybris, Alcibiades comes to resemble, for a time, the 
philosopher Eros, who thinks that he is deficient (ἐνδεὴς εἶναι: 204a6) and therefore 
desires to become wise. Socrates’ love magic, however, can also produce an unintended 
result in those who fail to understand him: eros for Socrates. The philosopher has many 
lovers in the Symposium. Alcibiades seems to be still in love with Socrates (222c2-3); 
Aristodemus is “very much a lover” (ἐραστῆς) of Socrates (173b3-4), and, according to 
Alcibiades, Charmides, Glaucon, Euthydemus, Diocles, and “very many others” have 
been deceived into thinking that Socrates is a lover, while he is really a beloved (222b1-
4).  
 Alcibiades warns Agathon not to be deceived by Socrates: “So I tell you also, 
Agathon, not to be deceived by this man, but to watch out, learning from my experiences. 
Don’t, as the proverb says, learn like a fool by suffering” (222b5-7). It is Alcibiades’ own 
story, however, that contains the deceptive image of Socrates as wise and virtuous 
eromenos, and the dialogue contains suggestions that Agathon has acquired a better 
understanding of Socrates than Alcibiades. As I have argued, Agathon appears to learn 
from his interactions with Socrates, acknowledging his own ignorance, and being eager to 
receive more of Socrates’ critical praise without repeating his accusation of hybris a 
second time. Agathon, moreover, is the only one of the symposiasts with whom Socrates 
engages, however briefly, in dialectic, and the only one whom Socrates addresses as 
“beloved.”  At the end of the dialogue, there is still another hint of Agathon’s superiority 
as interlocutor. After many of the others have left (223b6-8), and first Aristodemus 
(223b8-c1), and then Aristophanes (223d7-8) have fallen asleep, it is Agathon who 
remains conversing with Socrates until dawn (223d7-8). Socrates is interrupted before he 
can praise Agathon (223a3-b6), but Plato pays the good poet a compliment in 
representing him as the last to fall asleep. The soft and effeminate Agathon, the dialogue 
thus suggests, has a better understanding of Socrates than either Alcibiades or 
Aristophanes. He deserves from us the close attention he himself gives Socrates.32 
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